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CIL RIGHTS SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
During the 1992-93 survey period, the Tenth Circuit dealt with impor-
tant procedural issues affecting the ability of both individual litigants and
administrative agencies to bring civil rights claims. In Castner v. Colorado
Springs CablevisionI the Tenth Circuit followed other circuits by requiring
district courts to give "serious consideration" to requests for appointed
counsel in employment discrimination cases.2 This may enhance the abil-
ity of disadvantaged parties to bring claims pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 The subpoena power of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") was expanded by EEOC v. Citicorp Din-
ers Club.4 Holding that the EEOC can compel an employer to compile
information within the employer's control, the Tenth Circuit has arguably
given the EEOC the power to require employers to manufacture or create
previously undocumented information.5 In Baker v. Board of Regents of Kan-
sa.s6 the Tenth Circuit, utilizing the rationale of Garcia v. Wilson,7 held that
claims brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 and section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act9 should be governed by a state's general per-
sonal injury statute of limitations.
10
I. ACCESS TO THE COURT SYSTEM FOR DISADVANTAGED LITIGANTS
THROUGH DISCRETIONARY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
A. Background
Section 706(f) of the Civil Rights Act of 196411 deals with enforce-
ment of the equal opportunity employment provisions. In conjunction
with the power for an aggrieved party to file a civil action, section
706(f) (1) provides that in employment discrimination cases, the district
court has the discretion to appoint an attorney upon the plaintiff's re-
quest. 12 This power to appoint counsel in employment discrimination
1. 979 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1992).
2. Id. at 1421.
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
4. 985 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1993).
5. Id. at 1041 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
6. 991 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1993).
7. 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). See infra text accompany-
ing notes 146-54.
8. Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin by any
program or activity receiving federal funding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
9. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against handicapped
persons by programs or activities receiving federal funding. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
10. Baker, 991 F.2d at 632-33.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1988).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988).
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cases is in addition to the more general provisions of the in forma
pauperis statute.
13
Section 706(f) (1) provides little guidance to courts to determine
when a request for an appointed attorney is just.14 This lack of guidance,
however, does not diminish the importance of the provision within the
statute; legislative history indicates that the provision was a valued part of
the legislation. 15 The provision's continued presence, despite numerous
amendments to the Act as a whole, also indicates consistent congressional
support. 16 In fact, a House Report on the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Act of 1972 indicates that Congress continues to include the provision
because the "nature of Title VII actions more often than not pits parties of
unequal strength and resources against each other."17 Early cases indicate
the importance for courts, through the exercise of sound discretion, to
support the implicit intentions of Congress when making a decision to
appoint counsel.' 8
Judicial interpretation of section 706(f)(1) has established that the
appointment of counsel in an employment discrimination case is not a
statutory or constitutional right.1 9 The decision rests solely upon the dis-
cretion of the district courtjudge.2 0 Generally, circuits will only reverse a
trial court's failure to appoint counsel if the trial court abuses its discre-
tion.2 1 The decision may also be reviewable, however, if "the district
13. The general in forma pauperis provision found at 28 U.S.C. § 1915 authorizes court
discretion to allow proceedings to commence without court costs and allows the court to
request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d) (1988).
In Edmonds v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 315 F. Supp. 523 (D. Kan. 1970) the
United States District Court for the District of Kansas held that when a plaintiff requests an
appointed attorney in an employment discrimination case the governing statute is 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) as opposed to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Edmonds, 315 F. Supp. at 525.
14. Poindexter v. F.B.I., 737 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
15. 110 CONG. REac. 12,722 (1964) (indicating the necessity of the provision because "the
maintenance of the suit may impose a great burden on the poor individual complainant");
id. at 14,196 (rejection by Senate of Act that would have taken away the courts' power to
appoint attorneys under Title VII); id. at 14,201 (rejection by Senate of amendment that
would have allowed appointment of attorneys contingent to the consent of the attorney).
16. Hilliard v. Volcker, 659 F.2d 1125, 1128-29 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
17. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137, 2148.
18. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1319 (9th Cir.
1981) (concluding that a possible award of attorney's fees may be insufficient incentive for
counsel to take a case); Edmonds v. E.I. duPont deNemours, 315 F. Supp. 532, 525 (D.Kan.
1970) (indicating that a proceeding in employment discrimination is one in which "the pub-
lic has a substantial interest").
19. See, e.g., Poindexter v. F.B.I., 737 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1984);Jenkins v. Chemi-
cal Bank, 721 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1983); Ivey v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673
F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982); Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir.
1977).
20. Poindexter, 737 F.2d at 1179.
21. White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203, 205 (5th Cir. 1981);
Spanos v. Penn. Central Transp. Co., 470 F.2d 806, 808 (3d Cir. 1972).
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court's decision does not represent the reasoned judgement necessary to
application of that standard."
22
Many circuits have established three factors to be considered when
determining a need to appoint counsel in employment discrimination
cases:23 (1) the ability of the plaintiff to afford an attorney; (2) the efforts
of the plaintiff to secure counsel; and (3) the merits of the plaintiff's
case. 24 In addition, a number of circuits have established a fourth fac-
tor-the plaintiff's ability to prepare and present the case without aid of
counsel.
25
B. Castner v. Colorado Springs Cablevision26
1. Facts
Susan Castner filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that her em-
ployer, Colorado Springs Cablevision, violated provisions of Title VII and
the Equal Pay Act.2 7 Although the EEOC dismissed the charges, Ms.
Castner pursued her Title VII claim in the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado alleging gender discrimination and retaliation.
2 8
At the time of filing she was unemployed, lived in Oregon, and had no
savings. 29 She had contacted a number of attorneys, none of whom
agreed to represent her.30 She applied for leave to file in forma pauperis,
and for the appointment of counsel pursuant to both section 706(f) (1)
and 28 U.S.C. § 1915.31 The district court allowed her to proceed without
paying court costs but denied the appointment of counsel.
32
Ms. Castner made three more attempts to acquire appointed counsel.
One week after the first denial she wrote to the court explaining her situa-
tion, including her inability to pay for an attorney, her absence from Colo-
rado, her lack of familiarity with law, and her inability to obtain counsel on
a contingency basis. 33 The court denied the motion stating, "[a] plaintiff is
not entitled to court-appointed counsel in a civil action."3 4 Next, in re-
22. Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1318. See also Caston, 556 F.2d at 1310 (remanding because the
court was "unable to conclude that the district exercised a reasoned and well informed
discretion").
23. See Poindexter, 737 F.2d at 1180 n.10 (discussing the importance of having guidance
when a decision is left to the "informed decision of the District Court").
24. Gadson v. Concord Hosp., 966 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1992); Gonzalez v. Carlin, 907
F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1990); Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Dep't, 763 F.2d 757, 760
(6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1036 (1985); Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731
F.2d 587, 590 (8th Cir. 1984); Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1318 (9th Cir.
1981); Jones v. WFYR Radio/RKO Gen., 626 F.2d 576, 577 (7th Cir. 1980).
25. Poindexter, 737 F.2d at 1185; Jenkins v. Chemical Bank, 721 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir.
1983); Hudak v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 586 F.2d 105, 106 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 985 (1979).
26. 979 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1992).
27. Id. at 1419.
28. Id.
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sponse to a scheduling conference being set, Ms. Castner motioned for a
ninety-day extension and a reconsideration of the court's denial of ap-
pointed counsel.3 5 The motions were again denied.3 6 Finally, seven days
before the scheduling conference, she again requested appointed counsel
and informed the court that she would be unable to pay for a flight to
Denver for the conference.3 7 The court issued a show cause order requir-
ing Ms. Castner to explain why the case should not be dismissed for failure
to prosecute.3 8 Her response detailed her inability to travel between Ore-
gon and Colorado and stated that the difficulties could be remedied by
appointment of local counsel.3 9 The court dismissed the case and ad-
dressed the repeated requests for appointed counsel stating that this was
"a civil case and plaintiff simply has no right to prosecute her claim at
government expense."40 Ms. Castner appealed the court's denial of ap-
pointed counsel and the dismissal of her action for lack of prosecution.
41
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
Articulating the factors utilized by other circuits, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff seeking appointed counsel "must
make affirmative showings of (1) financial inability to pay for counsel, (2)
diligence in attempting to secure counsel and (3) meritorious allegations
of discrimination."4 2 In addition, the court indicated that the fourth fac-
tor, "capacity to present case without counsel," should be considered by
courts in close cases to "aid in exercising discretion."
43
With respect to the reviewability of the decision not to appoint coun-
sel, the court indicated that the general rule limited review to abuses of
discretion. 44 The court reasoned that this would presuppose "the applica-
tion of a reasoned and well informed judgement, guided by sound legal
principles."45 Finding that the district court failed to give an adequate
reason for denying appointed counsel, the court of appeals held that the
record did not contain sufficient information to determine whether there
was an abuse of discretion, and remanded. 46 The court also vacated the
dismissal of the action because the failure to prosecute appeared to be







41. Id. at 1419.
42. Id. at 1421.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1422-23.
45. Id. at 1423.
46. Id.





In addition to articulating and accepting the four factors utilized by
the majority of the circuits in determining the need for appointed coun-
sel, the Tenth Circuit further explained these standards and their applica-
tions. Concerning the "ability to afford" factor, the court stated that a
party need not be destitute for counsel to be appointed.48 In fact, the
court indicated that a qualification for in forma pauperis constitutes a
clear indication of inability to pay.49 According to the Tenth Circuit, the
proper inquiry was the ability of the plaintiff to hire counsel and still meet
daily expenses. 50 This concrete standard allows courts to consider specific
facts and make more accurate decisions,
The court provided an analytical base to determine adequate "efforts
to secure counsel," by enumerating that lower courts consider the number
of attorneys contacted, the availability of appropriate counsel, and the
plaintiff's level of skill at acquiring help.5 1 This base is helpful because it
illustrates a number of reasons why a person may be unable to obtain
counsel that are unrelated to the merits of the claim or the plaintiff's
financial needs.
52
With respect to the "merits" factor, the court made clear that trial
courts should not give preclusive effect to an EEOC finding of a lack of
evidence to support a claim of discrimination.53 The court stated that
while an EEOC decision should be a "highly probative" factor in making a
determination on the merits, the district court should always make an in-
dependent determination. 54 This treatment of the effect of the EEOC de-
termination seems consistent with congressional intent, since the statute
provides that a plaintiff can bring a civil suit upon a dismissal of the claim
by the EEOC.55
The Tenth Circuit indicated that in close cases, courts should utilize
the fourth factor, the plaintiff's ability to present the case without coun-
sel.5 6 The use of this factor as a type of tiebreaker is different from a
number of decisions in other circuits that have treated the plaintiff's abil-
ity to present a case equally with the other factors.5 7 Other circuits have
48. Id. at 1421-22.
49. Id. at 1422.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. SeePoindexter v. F.B.I., 737 F.2d 1173, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (providing a discussion
of the competing notions of the role of the attorney in weeding out frivolous claims); see also
Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981) (arguing that
accepting failure to obtain counsel as evidence the claim is without merit directly contradicts
the congressional mandate and purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1)); Caston v. Sears, Roe-
buck, & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1977) (indicating that a plaintiff with a meritori-
ous claim may be unable to obtain counsel due to unpopularity or unfamiliarity).
53. Castner, 979 F.2d at 1422.
54. Id.
55. See 110 CONG. REc. 12,722 (1964).
56. Castner, 979 F.2d at 1421.
57. SeefHunterv. Department of Air Force Agency, 846 F.2d 1314,1317 (1lth Cir. 1988)
(citing ability of plaintiff to understand procedural and substantive issues as factor for court
consideration); Poindexter v. F.B.I., 737 F.2d 1173, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (articulating all
1994]
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recognized that a plaintiff with the ability to represent oneself pro se
should be precluded from appointed counsel despite the fact the first
three factors are met.5 8 In the Tenth Circuit, the fourth factor serves as an
additional guide for lower courts only when the first three factors do not
clearly indicate that appointed counsel is appropriate.
The articulation of these four important factors, and the remand of
the case, give rise to a number of differing viewpoints on lower courts' use
of discretionary power. 59 In this case, the Tenth Circuit rightly concluded
that trial judges need to indicate the underlying considerations used in
making the decision to deny appointed counsel.60 Although it is impor-
tant to allow trial courts flexibility in exercising discretion, 61 Congress has
indicated its policy intentions in employment discrimination cases,6 2 and
it is important for courts to interpret the statute in light thereof.63 Con-
sidering the difficulties caused by coercive appointments of counsel, a flex-
ible application of balanced discretion is needed to both support the
intentions of Congress and protect the scarce resources of the court
system.
6 4
Pro se litigants are saddled with numerous difficulties. 65 The trial
court's terse rejection of the plaintiff's request for counsel in Castner is
evidence of but one of the hurdles such litigants face.6 6 By articulating
the four factors and requiring the "serious consideration" of requests for
counsel, the Tenth Circuit has sent a strong message to the district courts,
namely, that the discretionary appointment of counsel is a valued and nec-
essary part of the employment discrimination legislation.
four factors as important for consideration);Jenkins v. Chemical Bank, 721 F.2d 876, 880 (2d
Cir. 1983) (indicating that the additional considerations of the plaintiffs legal ability were
needed to expand the inquiry for a more flexible approach).
58. See Hudak v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 586 F.2d 105, 106 (8th Cir. 1978) (former law
professor denied appointed counsel despite meeting the criteria for the first three factors),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979).
59. The Honorable HenryJ. Friendly contends that there are at least a "half dozen dif-
ferent definitions of 'abuse of discretion'." HenryJ. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31
EMORY LJ. 747, 763 (1982).
60. Castner, 979 F.2d at 1423.
61. Friendly, supra note 59, at 764 (concluding that different definitions of discretion
are "not only defensible but essential").
62. Castner, 979 F.2d at 1421; see also Jenkins, 721 F.2d at 879 (indicating Congress' con-
cern for representation in Title VII actions).
63. Friendly, supra note 59, at 783.
64. See Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1989) (discussion of
disadvantages to indiscriminate appointment of counsel in civil cases). See generally William
B. Fisch, Coercive Appointments of Counsel in Civil Cases in Forma Pauperis: An Easy Case Makes
Hard Law, 50 Mo. L. Rav. 527 (1985) (discussion specific to coercive appointments through
the Missouri in forma pauperis statute).
65. See Steven C. Tempelman, Survey, Civil Procedure Survey, 70 DENY. L. Rv. 665, 668-70
(1993) (outlining difficulties pro se litigants face in the court system).
66. See text accompanying note 34.
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II. ExPANSION OF THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS OF THE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
A. Background
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is a fed-
eral administrative agency that was established by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.67 One of the EEOC's purposes is to investigate allega-
tions of discrimination against employees in violation of Title VII. 68 Pur-
suant to a charge being filed, Title VII of the 1964 Act allows the EEOC
"access to, for the purposes of examination, and the right to copy any
evidence . . . relevant to the charge under investigation." 69 The 1964 Act
gave the commission the power to "examine witnesses under oath and to
require documentary evidence relevant and material to the charge under
investigation."
70
The 1972 amendments to Title VI1 71 conferred additional powers on
the commission. The amendments replaced the 1964 language that au-
thorized testimony of witnesses and production of documentary evi-
dence 72 with a statement making a provision of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA") applicable to all hearings and investigations by
the commission. 73 This provision made the investigatory powers of the
EEOC equivalent to those of the National Labor Relations Board.
74
Similar to the 1964 Act, section 161 of the NLRA addresses "access,
for the purpose of examination, and the right to copy" relevant evidence
in the possession of the employer.75 Section 161 also grants the power to
issue subpoenas and to request enforcement of those subpoenas by the
federal district courts.76 This subpoena power includes "requiring the at-
tendance and testimony of witnesses and production of any evidence in
such proceeding or investigation requested in such application." 77 The
provision states further that any person served with a subpoena "requiring
production of any evidence in his possession or under his control" may
petition to have a subpoena revoked. 78 The distinction between docu-
mentary evidence and "any evidence" in a party's possession or control has
created confusion as to whether the EEOC has the power to force employ-
ers to compile evidence not in documentary form.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1988).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
69. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 709(a), 78 Stat. 241, 264 (1964) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1988)).
70. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 710(a), 78 Stat. 241, 264 (1964) (as
amended 1972).
71. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 7, 86 Stat. 103,
109 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (1988)).
72. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 709(a).
73. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 7.
74. National Labor Relations Act § 11, 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1988).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id.
1994]
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In determining the limits of the EEOC's power to enforce Title VII,
courts have generally interpreted the Act and its investigatory provisions
broadly. 79 Some cases prior to the 1972 amendments, however, held that
the statutory language of the Civil Rights Act did not empower the EEOC
to force employers to compile information.8 0 Since the 1972 amend-
ments, a number of jurisdictions have concluded that the amendments
expanded the EEOC's power, allowing it to force an employer to compile
information.8 1 Other jurisdictions have drawn a distinction between an
order to compile existing information, and one that requires the manufac-
ture and compilation of previously undocumented information.8 2 The
Tenth Circuit has not previously addressed these specific issues.8 3
B. Citicorp Diners Club v. EEOC
8 4
1. Facts
Deborah Hinson, a black female employee of Citicorp Diners Club,
Inc., filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that she was denied a promo-
tion because of her race and sex.8 5 The EEOC commenced an investiga-
tion, and Diners Club initially complied with requests for information
concerning their promotion policies.86 However, when the EEOC made
79. See Motorola Inc. v. Mclain, 484 F.2d 1339, 1344 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1974).
80. SeeJoslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 336 F. Supp. 941, 947 (D. Colo. 1971) (holding
that "no statute requires the employer to compile anything"); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC,
295 F. Supp. 950, 953-54 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (holding that the EEOC could not compel compila-
tion or preparation of research or summary), aff'd, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969). But see
Local No. 104, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237, 243 (9th Cir. 1971) ("Local
104 contends that there is something unique about an order to compile lists. Local 104 is
mistaken.").
81. SeeEEOC v. Maryland Cup Corp., 785 F.2d 471, 478 (4th Cir. 1986) (concluding that
the EEOC had the power to both compel production of evidence not presently in documen-
tary form and require an employer to compile evidence), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 815 (1986);
EEOC v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 668 F.2d 304, 313 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that the argu-
ment against the power to force compilation has been correctly rejected in other cases); New
Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Brown, 507 F.2d 160, 164-65 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that a
subpoena is not invalid simply because it requires compilation of evidence by the employer).
82. See EEOC v. Gladieux Refinery, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 927, 935 n.2 (N.D. Ind. 1986). In
a case discussing the scope of pre-trial discovery in which a number of EEOC cases were cited
to support the contention that courts can require defendants to compile information, the
Second Circuit drew a distinction between compiling information and manufacturing evi-
dence. See Parents' Comm. of Pub. Sch. 19 v. Community Sch. Bd., N.Y., 524 F.2d 1138, 1141-
42 (2d Cir. 1975).
83. Although Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 336 F. Supp. 941 (1971), did come up on
appeal, the Tenth Circuit did not address the issue of the power of the EEOC to require
compilation of evidence. Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973). Also,
although Circle K Corp. v. EEOC, 501 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1974), is cited as a case support-
ing the power of the EEOC to compel compilations of evidence, in fact the case was limited
to the issues of the "unduly burdensome" and "scope" aspects of the evidence subpoenaed.
See Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 344 (10th Cir. 1975) (stating that the court in
Circle K refused "to recognize the objections that the information lacked relevancy and was
too burdensome").
84. 985 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1993).




further requests concerning Diners Club's "within promotion"8 7 policy,
Diners Club refused to comply, contending that the information did not
exist.88
The EEOC issued and served a subpoena to compel Diners Club to
produce the information regarding "within promotion" policies.
8 9
Among other things, the subpoena required descriptions of positions
awarded as "within promotions"; the name, race, and sex of employees
awarded those positions as well as those who selected and/or recom-
mended them; the name, race, and sex of individuals in a position to rec-
ommend a "within promotion"; and a statement detailing reasons for
using the "within promotion" policy. 90 Diners Club requested that the
EEOC modify or revoke the subpoena.9 1 The EEOC refused and Diners
Club then notified the EEOC that it would not comply with the
subpoena.
92
The EEOC petitioned the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado for an order to enforce the subpoena.93 At the hearing, to
show cause why the order should not be enforced, Diners Club argued
that the EEOC had no authority to compel development and compilation
of information not then in existence. 94 In an affidavit presented at the
hearing, an employee of Diners Club explained that the information re-
quested was not "retrievable in any existing and/or accessible format."
9 5
The district court rejected the argument that the EEOC was without au-
thority to require compilation stating that the fact "that some of the infor-
mation sought exists in the minds of Citicorp employees does not absolve
Citicorp from compiling the information." 96 Citicorp Diners Club
appealed.
97
On appeal, Diners Club argued that the EEOC does not have the
power to force employers to interview employees and review files to pre-
87. "Within promotion" refers to promotion of current employees selected by managers
as opposed to posting the position. Id. at 1037 n.1.
88. Id. Diners Club also refused to give the EEOC information regarding promotions
outside Ms. Brown's workgroup because they did not feel it was relevant to Ms. Brown's
charge. Diners Club agreed only to provide information it felt was relevant and not unduly
burdensome. Id.
89. Id. The subpoena also required information regarding Diners Club's facilities
outside of Colorado. Id.
90. Id. at 1042-43 (Attachment A).
91. Id. at 1038.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. Diners Club had three other arguments. First, they argued that requests for in-
formation on nationwide facilities were overbroad. Second, they argued that because Ms.
Brown had individually settled her claim and requested a withdrawal of the charge, that the
subpoena was moot. Third, they argued that the requests to develop and compile informa-
tion were burdensome and overbroad. Id.
95. Id. at 1044 (Attachment B).
96. Id. at 1039 n.3. With respect to Diners Club's other arguments, the district court
agreed that the requests for information regarding nationwide facilities was overbroad. The
district court rejected Diners Club's contention that the subpoena was moot because Ms.
Brown had settled individually. The district court also rejected the contention that the sub-
poena was burdensome and overbroad. Id. at 1038.
97. Id. at 1038.
1994]
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pare summaries. 98 Diners Club contended that the subpoena power of the
EEOC was limited to requiring production of documents in existence for
the purposes of examination and copying.99 Diners Club asserted that the
Tenth Circuit opinion in Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEO0C0 0 established this
limit on the Commission's subpoena power.
10 1
2. Tenth Circuit Majority Opinion
The majority opinion of the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that
Joslin limited the subpoena power of the EEOC. 10 2 The court agreed that
the district court in Joslin held that the EEOC could not compel compila-
tion of information. 10 3 As the court pointed out, however, the issue was
not brought up on appeal and thus was not addressed in the Tenth Circuit
opinion. 10 4 The court considered Circle K Corp. v. EEOC'0 5 to be instruc-
tive on the issue of the subpoena power of the EEOC. 10 6 Despite the fact
that the Circle K opinion did not use the word "compile," the court argued
that the subpoena enforced by the court in Circle K required the employer
to develop and compile information.
10 7
The court added that other circuits have held that the EEOC can re-
quire an employer to compile information within its control and that the
power is not limited to production of already existing documents. 10 8 The
Tenth Circuit held that the EEOC could require Diners Club to compile
the requested information, including information existing solely in the
minds of employees.
10 9
98. Id. Diners Club brought two other matters up on appeal as well. First, it argued that
since Ms. Brown's alleged discrimination was based on race and sex, the EEOC should not be
allowed to subpoena documents and information on possible discrimination by national ori-
gin. Second, it argued that the subpoena requests were unduly burdensome. Id.
99. Id.
100. 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973).
101. Diners Club, 985 F.2d at 1038.
102. Id. at 1038-39.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1039.Joslin involved a subpoena requiring the employer to review thousands of
personnel files and information index cards and compile the information for the EEOC. 336
F. Supp. at 945. The district court held that the power of the EEOC was limited to production
of documentary evidence and that the EEOC could not force employers to compile anything.
Id. at 947. On appeal, the EEOC did not dispute the district court's holding regarding compi-
lation of information. Joslin, 483 F.2d at 183.
105. 501 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1974).
106. Diners Club, 985 F.2d at 1039.
107. Id. The subpoena in Circle K required the following:
a list of all applicants and present employees subjected to the polygraph examina-
tion, their racial ethnic identity and whether they were accepted or rejected; docu-
mentation of the nature, standardization and validity of the polygraph test and a list
of questions asked of each applicant; qualifications of the examiners who adminis-
tered the tests; testimony under oath of all knowledgeable employees and officers;
and all related matters.
Circle K 501 F.2d at 1054.
108. Diners Club, 985 F.2d at 1039. The court cited cases from the Fourth and Seventh
circuits.
109. Id. at 1039 n.3. The court added that nothing in the order required Diners Club to
track down and interview former employees. Id.
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3. Tenth Circuit Dissenting Opinion
Judge Paul J. Kelly dissented from the part of the court's opinion re-
quiring interviews of employees and production of documents resulting
from those interviews. 110 The dissent did not agree that the EEOC's sub-
poena power includes the authority to require the development or crea-
tion of new information. 111 Addressing the use of Circle Kby the majority,
the dissent pointed out that Circle K was limited on appeal to the issues
regarding the "unduly burdensome" and "scope of investigation" aspects
of the evidence subpoenaed.1 12 With respect to the subpoena enforced by
Circle K, the dissent concluded that the court only required compilation of
data already in existence and under the control of an employer. 113 Draw-
ing a distinction between compiling statistical information and creating
new information, the dissent contended that the information requested by
the EEOC in this case required Diners Club to conduct interviews and
produce new documents from those interviews.1 14 The dissent argued that
this "manufacturing of evidence" is not the proper function of a sub-
poena 15 and that the information may be properly pursued through sub-
poena of witnesses.
1 16
In support of these conclusions, the dissent pointed directly to the
statutory language of the Civil Rights Act and distinguished the request in
this case from those requests in the cases cited by the majority. 117 Despite
the amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 29 U.S.C. § 161,
the dissent relied on the fact that the first sentence of section 161 still
limits access to evidence "for the purpose of examining or to copy."
11 8
Distinguishing EEOC v. Maryland Cup Corp.t1 9 from the present case, the
dissent argued that requesting previously non-existent position statements
is far different from simply requesting lists of former employees and their
race. 12 0 The dissent concluded that at least some of the requests by the
With respect to the other issues on appeal the Tenth Circuit held that the EEOC could
request information on possible discrimination based on national origin and that the sub-
poena request was not unduly burdensome. Id. at 1039-40.
110. Id. at 1041-42. Judge Kelly concurred with the court holdings regarding the exten-
sion of the investigation to include possible discrimination based on national origin and the
employer's failure to make a showing regarding the unduly burdensome nature of the sub-
poena. Id. at 1040.
111. Id. at 1040.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1041.
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Parents Comm. v. Community Sch. Bd., 524 F.2d 1138, 1141 & n.7 (2d
Cir. 1975)).
116. Id. at 1041.
117. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 128-31.
118. Id. The implication being that the terms "copy" and "examination" refer solely to
documentary evidence.
119. 785 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1986).
120. Diners Club, 985 F.2d at 1041. In Maryland Cup the EEOC requested the employer to
compile information about the race and sex of former employees through examination of
photographs and interviews with current employees. Maryland Cup, 785 F.2d at 478.
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An important congressional concern with the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was that the EEOC not have the power to conduct "fish-
ing expeditions."1 22 Given this concern, it is questionable whether the in-
tent of the 1972 amendment was to expand the power of the EEOC to the
point at which the Commission can compel employers to conduct their
own investigations against themselves. 123 In fact, Congress did not amend
section 709 of Title VII, which still, with respect to evidence, authorizes
"access to, for the purposes of examination, and the right to copy."12 4
This language implies that authorization is limited to documentary
evidence.
125
A careful reading of the majority's opinion illuminates flaws in the
foundation of its argument. First, the majority patently rejected the use of
Joslin because the compilation issue was not addressed at the appellate
level. 126 However, the court in Circle K Corp. v. EEOC did not discuss the
issue on appeal either. 127 The court argued that the subpoena enforced by
the Tenth Circuit in Circle K required compilation of information. 12 8 Re-
gardless, the majority's application of Circle K undermines its basis for not
applying Joslin.
A second flaw in the majority's argument is pointed out in the dissent-
ing opinion. The information required in Diners Club is much different
than the information sought in the cases that the majority used to support
its conclusion. 12 9 For example, Maryland Cup required inspection of
photo identification badges and interviews with employees to determine
the race of former employees;' 30 Local 104 involved an order to compile a
list of names;13 ' and Circle K involved information about the administra-
tion of polygraph examinations. 132 In contrast, the subpoena in Diners
Club required the employer to interview employees and develop position
121. Diners Club, 985 F.2d at 1041-42.
122. The term "fishing expedition" refers specifically to the concern that the scope of
investigations be limited to evidence relative to the charge. See 110 CONG. REc. 6449 (1964)
(illustrating Senator Dirksen's concerns that the scope of EEOC investigations be limited).
However, it could be argued that the scope of an investigation is directly affected by the
investigatory powers utilized.
123. Diners Club, 985 F.2d at 1041 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1988).
125. See Maryland Cup, 785 F.2d at 478.
126. Diners Club, 985 F.2d at 1038-39.
127. Id. In fact, the district court in Circle Kset aside the EEOC subpoena on the grounds
that the information sought was not relevant to the charge and was too burdensome and
broad. Circle K 501 F.2d at 1054. Therefore, the only issues on appeal were the relevancy and
the burdensome aspects of the subpoena.
128. Id. at 1039.
129. See Diners Club, 985 F.2d at 1041 (distinguishing between compiling statistical infor-
mation and creating new information).
130. 785 F.2d at 479.
131. 439 F.2d 237, 240 (9th Cir. 1971).
132. 501 F.2d at 1054.
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papers with respect to a "within promotion" policy.133 The dissent's dis-
tinction between compiling information and creating information is an
important point that is not addressed by the majority.
Another issue ignored by the majority is whether the EEOC utilized
the most appropriate investigatory tool for the type of information sought.
When the pieces of information sought by the EEOC are undocumented
policies allegedly existing in the minds of employees, it would seem that
the more appropriate investigatory tool is a subpoena of witness testimony.
In this case, the information sought by the EEOC could have more easily
been obtained through the testimony of witnesses.
13 4
Despite any concern as to how the decision was reached, the major-
ity's opinion clearly supports the contention that the expanded power of
the EEOC includes the power to compel employers to compile existing
information that includes information not presently in documentary form.
III. APPLICATION OF GENERAL PERSONAL INJURY STATUTES OF
LIMITATION TO FEDERAL CrVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS
A. Background
Enactment of federal legislation creating a civil cause of action, but
without a specified statute of limitations, is not uncommon in federal stat-
utory law.13 5 When federal legislation is without a statute of limitations an
appropriate state statute of limitations is borrowed.13 6 Section 1988 pro-
vides in part that where the provisions of federal civil rights laws are insuf-
ficient to provide remedies, the laws of the jurisdiction in which the case is
filed should apply, so long as they are not inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion and the laws of the United States.
13 7
Section 1983 is an example of federal legislation enacted without a
statute of limitations.13 8 In applying the provisions of section 1988 to sec-
tion 1983 claims the courts have required a three-step inquiry.13 9 First, the
court must determine that a federal rule does not apply.140 Second, the
court selects and borrows an analogous state rule. 141 Third, if the state
rule is consistent with federal law, it is applied.
142
133. 985 F.2d at 1037.
134. Id. at 1041. The EEOC has the power to subpoena both documents and witness. 29
U.S.C. § 161(1) (1988).
135. Board of Regents of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980).
136. See Paul Rathburn, Amending a Statute of Limitations for 42 U.S. C. § 1983: More Than 'A
Half Measure of Uniformity', 73 MINN. L. REV. 85, 90-91 (1988) (discussing the borrowing of
state limitations periods for federal claims under § 1983).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). The practice of applying state limitations periods so long as
not inconsistent with the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States is also sanctioned
by the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 allows persons whose rights have been de-
prived under color of state law to seek redress by the courts. Id. See also Rathburn, supra note
136, at 87 (arguing that Congress should set a statute of limitations for § 1983).
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Prior to Wilson v. Garcia143 the Supreme Court advised federal courts
to apply the state statute of limitations that was "most appropriate" 144 or
"most analogous."' 45 The approaches utilized by different states to apply
these tests and determine the "most appropriate" or "most analogous" stat-
ute of limitations created a large amount of confusion and inconsistency
among the circuits.
14 6
The Supreme Court attempted to minimize confusion and increase
uniformity and certainty in section 1983 litigation with its holding in Wil-
son v. Garcia.147 Applying the standards set in Board of Regents of N.Y. v.
Tomanio and Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, the Court reiterated that the
statute most analogous to section 1983 claims should borrowed. 148 Since
federal law governs the choice of statutes of limitation, the court reasoned
that federal law should govern the decision as to which state cause of ac-
tion is most analogous to section 1983.149 In the interests of "uniformity,
certainty, and minimization of unnecessary litigation," the Court con-
cluded that the inquiry should no longer be on a case-by-case basis and
that the state statute most analogous to all section 1983 claims should be
applied. °50 Affirming the Tenth Circuit Garcia opinion, the Supreme
Court held that the appropriate statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims
was the state statute applicable to personal injury tort claims.
15
The Garcia opinion has not been completely accepted as the solu-
tion to the statute of limitation dilemma. 52 Legal theorists have pro-
posed a number of solutions to the problems still remaining.153 Never-
theless, the rule from Wilson has been extended by a number
of courts to include claims under 42 U.S.C § 1981154 and 42 U.S.C
143. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
144. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975).
145. Board of Regents of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980).
146. See Lee L. Cameron, Note, Civil Rights: Determining the Appropriate Statute of Limitations
for Section 1983 Claims, 61 NoRE DAME L. REV. 440, 442-43 (1986); Lawrence K. Hoyt, Survey,
Civil Rights, 62 DENy. U. L. REv. 59, 67 (1985); Rathburn, supra note 136, at 91-97.
147. 471 U.S. 261 (1985). Wilson v. Garcia came out of the Tenth Circuit. Gary Garcia
brought a § 1983 claim against a police officer for violating his civil rights and against the
police chief for negligently hiring and failing to train the officer. 731 F.2d 640, 642 (1984).
The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting that the suit was time barred. Id. The only issue
on appeal was which limitations period should be applied to the § 1983 federal claim. Id.
148. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268.
149. Id. at 269-70.
150. Id. at 272-73.
151. Id. at 277.
152. In her dissenting opinion Justice O'Connor considered the majority's "half baked
uniformity ... a poor substitute for the careful selection of the appropriate state law anal-
ogy." 471 U.S. at 286.
153. See Robert M. Jarvis & Judith Anne Jarvis, Commentary, The Continuing Problem of
Statutes of Limitations in Section 1983 Cases: Is the Answer Out at Sea?, 22J. MARSHALL L. REv.
285, 291 (1988) (proposing the use of the laches doctrine); Rathburn, supra note 136, at 113-
14 (proposing congressional legislation).
154. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); EEOC v. Gaddis, 733 F.2d 1373
(10th Cir. 1984).
Section 1981 guarantees to all persons in the United States equal rights under the law
"as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1981 and Supp. 1992).
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§ 1985.155 This continuing extension of the Wilson holding is indicative of
ajudicial intent to characterize all civil rights claims as actions in personal
injury.
B. Baker v. Board of Regents of the State of Kansas
1 56
1. Facts
Marvin Baker, a Kansas state resident, was denied admission to the
1986 class of the University of Kansas Medical School. 15 7 The letter in-
forming Mr. Baker of his rejection was dated January 29, 1986.158 On Feb-
ruary 12, 1986, Mr. Baker met with the school's associate dean to discuss
the reasons for the denial of admission. 159 At this meeting, Mr. Baker was
informed that he was not accepted due to his poor performance at his
admission interview.16 0 On December 1, 1987, Mr. Baker's counsel re-
ceived a letter from the University of Kansas stating that Mr. Baker had the
highest GPA and MCAT score of any Kansas resident that was denied ad-
mission for the 1986 class.16 1 Mr. Baker filed suit against the Board of
Regents of the State of Kansas and the University of Kansas Medical
School on June 14, 1988.162
Mr. Baker initially sought a temporary injunction directing the Board
of Regents and the University of Kansas to admit him as a first year medi-
cal student pending the outcome of a trial.163 Mr. Baker filed four claims,
including reverse discrimination on the basis of race alleging a violation of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.164 Although the defendants argued
155. Marquis v. U.S. Sugar Corp., 652 F. Supp. 598, 602 (S.D. Fla. 1987). See also Williams
v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 625 n.1 (11th Cir. 1986); Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340,
343-45 (6th Cir. 1985).
Section 1985 provides redress for persons injured by conspiracies to deprive equal pro-
tection or equal privileges and immunities under the law. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1988).
156. 721 F. Supp. 270 (D. Kan. 1989).
157. Id. at 272. Mr. Baker had also been denied admission in 1984 and in 1985. Id.
158. Baker v. Board of Regents of Kansas, 768 F. Supp. 1436, 1437 (D. Kan. 1991).
159. Id. at 1438.
160. Id. During his interview, conducted by a panel of four people, Mr. Baker was asked
questions concerning abortion, religion, family history, and financial need. Mr. Baker felt
many of the questions were inappropriate and that no procedure governed the format or
substance of the interview. Baker, 721 F. Supp. at 273.
161. Baker, 768 F. Supp. at 1438. Admissions at the University of Kansas Medical School
are based on four criteria: GPA, MCAT, advisor's recommendation, and interviews. Baker, 721
F. Supp. at 272.
162. Id. at 274.
163. Id. at 271.
164. Id. at 272. Mr. Baker also alleged violations of the 14th amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 1 of the Bill of
Rights of the State of Kansas Constitution, and due process of law guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution. Id. The district court stated that claims cannot be brought under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments and that the plaintiff was limited to actions pursuant to federal
statutes enforcing the Constitution. Id. at 273. Also, relief was not available under Title VII
because it is reserved for employment discrimination. Id. at 274. Finally, the court stated that
Mr. Baker's claims under § 1981 and the Kansas Constitution were barred by the Eleventh
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id. Mr. Baker was left with only his claim under Title
VI. Id.
The district court also noted that Mr. Baker had filed a motion to add claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Rehabilitation Act, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Id.
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that a private citizen could not sue under Title VI, the court ruled that it
was proper to imply a private cause of action.
165
There is no federal statute of limitations for an implied cause of ac-
tion. 16 6 The defendants argued that the state's two-year statute of limita-
tions, which is routinely borrowed for civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1983, should also be applied for Title VI claims.' 6 7 Seeing no
reason why the same statute should not be applied to a claim which could
have been prosecuted under section 1981 or section 1983, the district
court applied the two-year personal injury statute of limitations to the Title
VI claim. 168 The court concluded that Mr. Baker knew or had reason to
know of the possible violation of his rights when he first learned of his
denial of admission.' 69 Mr. Baker had received his rejection letter more
than two years before the filing of the action. 170 For this reason, among
others, Mr. Baker was denied injunctive relief.
17 1
At trial, the court continued to hold that the two-year statute of limita-
tions period should apply to Mr. Baker's claims asserted under Title VI
and section 1981.172 The court also stated that the two-year statute of limi-
tations would apply to the claims asserted under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act which Mr. Baker
moved to add to his complaint.' 73 Holding that Mr. Baker filed his case
after the limitations period for his federal claims had expired, the district
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
174
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court's analysis that the two-
year statute of limitation should be applied to the federal civil rights claims
asserted by Mr. Baker.1 75 Citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the court stated that
Congress has directed courts to apply state statute of limitations to federal
claims so long as they are not inconsistent with the Constitution or the
laws of the United States. 176 Utilizing the rule of Wilson, the court ex-
plained that the first step in selecting an appropriate statute of limitations
is to characterize the essential nature of the federal action, which is a mat-
165. Id. at 274.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 275. The court reasoned that in Garcia the Tenth Circuit held that § 1983 civil
rights claims should be characterized as personal injury actions. Id. at 274. Additionally, the
Tenth Circuit indicated that the same analysis should apply to § 1981 claims in EEOC v.
Gaddis, 733 F.2d 1373, 1377 (10th Cir. 1984). Id. at 275. Finally, most courts have held that
under Title VI or analogous statutes state statutes of limitation should apply. Id. (citing a
number of cases). According to the court, Pike v. City Mission, 731 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1984)
established that Kansas' two-year statute was the appropriate limitation to apply. Id. at 275.
169. Id. at 275.
170. See text accompanying notes 145-49.
171. Baker, 768 F. Supp. at 1438.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1442.




ter of federal law. 17 7 The court pointed out that Wilson characterized all
section 1983 claims as actions of injury to personal rights.1 78 The court
also pointed out that section 1981 claims have likewise been characterized
as actions of injury to personal rights.179 According to the court, Kansas'
two-year statute of limitations is appropriate for claims under sections
1981 and 1983 because they are claims based on injury to the rights of
others.
18 0
The Tenth Circuit next considered whether the two-year statute of
limitations appliable to the other civil rights claims should apply to Title
VI claims.181 In characterizing the nature of the claim, the court focused
on the elements of a cause of action under Title VI, as opposed to the
remedy, because the elements more fully describe a claim's essence.
18 2
The elements for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are: "(1) that
there is racial or national origin discrimination and (2) the entity engag-
ing in discrimination is receiving federal financial assistance."' 83 The
court stated that Title VI is a civil rights statute closely analogous to sec-
tions 1981 and 1983 because it specifically refers to discrimination against
a "person," which is similar to the language in sections 1981 and 1983
protecting "persons" from deprivation of rights, and because it provides
equal rights under the law to all "persons."
18 4
The court concluded that Title VI claims are best characterized as
actions for injury to personal rights. 185 Citing directly from the Tenth Cir-
cuit decision in Garcia, the court stated that this decision would promote a
"consistent and uniform framework by which suitable statutes of limita-
tions can be determined for civil rights claims."
186
The court next considered Mr. Baker's claim pursuant to section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. 18 7 The court, citing other districts, stated that
section 504 is a "civil rights statute . . . closely analogous to section
1983."188 Since the Supreme Court held that all section 1983 claims are
best characterized as claims for personal injuries, and as section 504 claims
are closely analogous to section 1983 claims, the court held that section
504 claims are also best characterized as claims for personal injuries.
189
Therefore, the court concluded that Mr. Baker's section 504 claim was





180. Id. (citing Pike v. City of Mission, Kan., 731 F.2d 655, 658 (10th Cir. 1984)).
181. Id. at 631.
182. Id. (citing Garcia, 731 F.2d at 650-51).
183. Id. (citingJackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 903 (E.D.Mo. 1979), aff'd 620 F.2d
680 (8th Cir. 1980)).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing Garcia, 731 F.2d at 643).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 632.
190. Id.
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C. Analysis
An initial concern with the Tenth Circuit's decision in Baker is the
lack of depth with which the court considered the proper characterization
of the federal civil rights claims. In Wilson, the Supreme Court focused on
the intent of the legislature when enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
The Supreme Court examined the issue as a question of legislative intent,
arguing that Congress "intended the identification of the appropriate stat-
ute of limitations to be an uncomplicated task."191 Examining the catalyst
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and the violence and deprivation of rights
in the South, the court concluded that the "atrocities that concerned Con-
gress in 1871 plainly sounded in tort."192 No such examination of legisla-
tive intent was relied on by the Tenth Circuit in Baker. On the contrary,
the Baker decision is grounded solely in similarities of the elements and
language of Title IV and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act.193 Despite the meticulous inquiry modeled in
Wilson, the Tenth Circuit barely addresses the intent of Congress in enact-
ing Title VI and section 504.
The extension of the Wilson rationale in Baker highlights a concern
initially articulated after the Wilson decision. By applying state statutes of
limitation a conflict may arise between federal and state interests.1 9 4 State
statutes of limitation are determined by state legislatures according to state
policy.1 9 5 A state statute of limitations may be so short as to undermine the
federal interest in protecting civil rights. Although the Supreme Court has
indicated that the state statute should not be borrowed if it conflicts with
federal law or federal interest, 196 neither Wilson nor Baker provide any gui-
dance as to when a state statute of limitations is so short that it infringes
on federal interests.
197
An overriding concern in Wilson and Baker is uniformity. 19 8 Both the
Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court characterize uniformity as an im-
portant federal interest vindicated by the civil rights statutes at issue.
199
On the other hand, the dissent in Wilson argued that the need for uni-
formity is simply a judicial perception that the courts have seized as an
opportunity to legislate.2 0 0 Subsequent decisions consistent with Wilson
191. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275.
192. Id. at 277.
193. With respect to Title VI, the Tenth Circuit focuses on the use of the word "person"
in both Title VI and §§ 1983 and 1981. Baker, 991 F.2d at 631. With both Title VI and § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, the court relies on the fact that they are analogous to § 1983 claims.
Id. at 631-32.
194. See Cameron, supra note 146, at 448-50.
195. Id. at 449.
196. Id. at 451.
197. There are cases that have articulated that federal policy should establish a minimum
limitation period so as not to infringe on federal interests. See Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654
F.2d 856, 862 (2d Cir. 1981) (advocating a two-year floor for § 1983 statutes of limitation).
198. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275-76; Baker, 991 F.2d at 631.
199. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 279; Baker, 991 F.2d at 631.
200. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 284 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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have solved some remaining uniformity problems.2 0 1 Nevertheless, these
decisions fail to address the disparity of limitations periods among differ-
ent states.
2 02
It has been argued that the only viable solution to the uniformity
problem is congressional legislation.203 In 1990 Congress enacted a four-
year statute of limitations but limited its use to federal claims and causes of
action created by Congress after December 1, 1990.204 However, a
Supreme Court decision arguably opened the door to apply the statute to
other federal claims. In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc. the
court stated that "when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly pro-
vides a closer analogy than available state statutes.., we have not hesitated
to turn away from state law."20 5 Using Agency to apply the 1990 legislation
to all federal civil rights statutes without limitations periods is another pos-
sible solution to the uniformity problem that both the Tenth Circuit and
the Supreme Court find so disturbing. Any movement in this direction by
the courts would arguably be contrary to the express intent of Congress
that the statute only apply to federal claims enacted after 1990. It is not
likely that the Tenth Circuit or the Supreme Court is willing to go that far
for uniformity.
CONCLUSION
During the 1993 survey period the Tenth Circuit addressed some pro-
cedural issues affecting the ability of parties to bring civil rights claims.
Castner enhanced the ability of the disadvantaged to pursue employment
discrimination claims by supporting the value of discretionary appoint-
ments of counsel. Baker affects the ability of any party to bring a civil rights
claim under Title VI or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by extending
Wilson and applying a state's general personal injury statute of limitations
to these federal claims. Finally, the Tenth Circuit enhanced the ability of
the EEOC to investigate employment discrimination in Diners Club by en-
forcing an EEOC subpoena to compile previously undocumented
information.
Daniel E. Rohner
201. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989) (holding that states with more than one
personal injury statute of limitations should apply the general or residual statute).
202. See Rathburn, supra note 136, at 108-09 n.154 (illustrating a hypothetical forum-
shopping situation where the disparity in limitations for same claim ranges from one to six
years).
203. See Rathburn, supra note 136, at 113-14.
204. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 1658 (Pub. L. No. 101-650). See David D. Sie-
gal, The Statute of Limitations in Federal Practice, Including the New "General" One in Federal Ques-
tion Cases, 134 F.R.D. 481 (1991).
205. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 148 (1987) (applying
four-year statute of limitations from the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15'(1982), to civil "RICO"
suits).
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